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THE COSTS OF SELF-DRIVING CARS: 
RECONCILING FREEDOM AND PRIVACY WITH 
TORT LIABILITY IN AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE 
REGULATION 
Jack Boeglin 
17 Yale J.L. & Tech. 171 (2015) 
ABSTRACT 
Nearly all of the literature on self-driving cars explores 
either their impact on social values, like freedom and 
privacy, or the questions they pose for legal liability. These lines 
of inquiry have developed largely in isolation, with little effort 
to examine how they might intersect and inform each 
other. This Article advances an integrated approach: regulators 
should consider freedom, privacy, and liability as interlocking 
pieces—not independent elements—of the puzzle of self-driving 
car regulation. 
Explorations into the laws of agency and product liability 
demonstrate that an actor’s post-sale control of and access to an 
autonomous vehicle may determine that actor’s liability for its 
accidents. As a result, the more that users want to preserve their 
freedom and privacy, the more liability they may end up 
retaining for the behavior of their self-driving cars. This Article 
then provides the first sustained inquiry into how different 
liability regimes for autonomous vehicles might generate sizable 
efficiencies in liability and insurance administration. 
The Article closes by making a normative appeal to 
regulators: only allow autonomous vehicles to infringe on user 
freedom and privacy to the extent that (1) reductions in freedom 
and privacy lead to equivalent reductions in liability for the 
users of self-driving cars; and (2) the social costs incurred by 
forfeiting these values will be outweighed by administrative 
efficiencies or other identifiable social benefits. By tying the 
reduction of user freedom and privacy to improvements in both 
individual and social welfare, this Article charts a possible 
course for regulators to reconcile freedom and privacy with tort 
liability in autonomous vehicle regulation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine the night of your wedding anniversary ten years 
from now: your car, driving itself, heads over to the babysitter’s 
house while you and your spouse get dressed, returns in time to 
chauffeur you downtown, and then parks while you head into 
the restaurant for dinner. Sound fanciful? Maybe so, but the 
Center for Automotive Research predicts that the first 
commercially available, fully autonomous vehicles1 could come 
to a dealership near you as early as 2019.2  
California, Florida, Michigan, and Nevada have already 
passed laws that allow the testing of autonomous vehicles 
(AVs) on public roads, with more states currently considering 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I will refer to a vehicle as autonomous or self-driving if the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration would rank it Level 4. See NAT’L 
HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., PRELIMINARY 
STATEMENT OF POLICY CONCERNING AUTOMATED VEHICLES 5 (2013), 
http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/Automated_Vehicles_Poli
cy.pdf (explaining that level 4 vehicles are “designed to perform all safety-
critical driving functions and monitor roadway conditions for an entire 
trip” and that “[s]uch a design anticipates that the driver will provide 
destination or navigation input, but is not expected to be available for 
control at any time during the trip”). Moreover, I limit my discussion to 
consumer vehicles. Though autonomous vehicle technology will 
undoubtedly be of great interest to the trucking industry, delivery services 
like FedEx, and other commercial enterprises, user freedom and privacy 
are of less concern in these contexts and will not be taken up in this 
Article. 
2 Josh Sanburn, Self-Driving Cars Available by 2019, Report Says, TIME, 
Aug. 16, 2012, http://business.time.com/2012/08/16/self-driving-cars-avail 
able-by-2019-report-says. 
2
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similar legislation.3 The stakes could hardly be higher: over ten 
million car crashes occur in this country each year,4 many of 
which result in tragic injuries and expensive lawsuits that 
burden the nation’s hospitals and court systems. Predictions 
that self-driving cars may be able to prevent many of these 
accidents have led some commentators to wholeheartedly 
endorse the impending arrival of AVs onto our nation’s 
roadways.5  
Not everyone views the arrival of AV technology quite so 
positively. Serious concerns about self-driving cars have also 
been raised, largely focusing on the impact these vehicles could 
have on three key issues: freedom, privacy, and liability. 6 
Though the automobile has stood as a symbol of freedom and 
personal autonomy for generations,7 some fear that legal and 
economic pressures might eventually restrict the frequency and 
scope of human driving.8 While both Nevada and California 
currently require that self-driving cars cede operational 
authority to human users whenever a human user requests 
control, 9  it is hard to predict whether this rule will be 
preserved if AV technology becomes more commonplace. 
Regulators have been even more concerned with the threat 
self-driving cars pose to their users’ privacy. For example, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Gabriel Weiner & Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Driving: Legislative 
and Regulatory Action, THE CTR. FOR INTERNET AND SOC., http://cyberlaw 
.stanford.edu/wiki/index.php/Automated_Driving:_Legislative_and_Regul
atory_Action (last visited Nov. 25, 2014). 
4 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012, 
at 693 tbl. 1103 (2012), http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012 
/tables/12s1103.pdf. 
5 Tom Simonite, Data Shows Google’s Robot Cars Are Smoother, Safer 
Drivers than You or I, MIT TECH. REV., Oct. 25, 2013, http://www 
.technologyreview.com/news/520746/data-shows-googles-robot-cars-are-
smoother-safer-drivers-than-you-or-i (favorably comparing the safety of 
automated drivers to their human counterparts). 
6 See, e.g., Andrew English, Autonomous Cars—Is This the End of Driving?, 
THE TELEGRAPH, Jan. 16, 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/motoring/road-
safety/10570935/Autonomous-cars-is-this-the-end-of-driving.html 
(discussing the implications of self-driving cars on driver freedom); 
Camille Francois, Self-Driving Cars Will Turn Surveillance Woes into a 
Mainstream Worry, WIRED (May 30, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014 
/05/self-driving-cars-will-turn-surveillance-woes-into-a-mainstream-issue 
(discussing concerns about the effect of self-driving cars on user privacy); 
Alexis C. Madrigal, If a Self-Driving Car Gets in an Accident, Who—or 
What—Is Liable?, THE ATLANTIC, Aug. 13, 2014, http://www.theatlantic 
.com/technology/archive/2014/08/if-a-self-driving-car-gets-in-an-accident-
who-is-legally-liable/375569 (discussing who should be held liable for self-
driving car accidents). 
7 See The Automobile Age, 10 WILSON Q. 64 (1986).  
8 See Philip E. Ross, Driverless Cars: Optional by 2024, Mandatory by 2044, 
IEEE SPECTRUM (May 29, 2014), http://spectrum.ieee.org/transportation 
/advanced-cars/driverless-cars-optional-by-2024-mandatory-by-2044. 
9 CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750(c)(1)(D) (West 2013); NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 
482A.190(2)(g) (2012). 
3
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California demands that the “manufacturer of the autonomous 
technology installed on a vehicle shall provide a written 
disclosure to the purchaser of an autonomous vehicle that 
describes what information is collected by the autonomous 
technology equipped on the vehicle.”10 Other measures might 
have the unintended consequence of diminishing user privacy: 
California also requires that all AVs preserve detailed records 
of the thirty seconds leading up to an accident. 11  Though 
intended to help determine fault in the event of an accident, 
this regulation could open the door to more continuous and 
invasive monitoring of AV behavior in the future. Some have 
even suggested that AV technology’s potential to infringe on 
privacy is so grave that self-driving cars should be prohibited 
altogether.12 
California’s decision to use the sensors installed on AVs to 
determine fault raises another concern: who should be held 
liable for crashes involving AVs? Though manufacturers, 
insurers, news outlets, and academics have all posed this 
question, they have not found easy answers. While some 
academics assert that the manufacturers of AVs should be held 
liable for their crashes under a products liability model, 13 
others claim that products liability would strangle the 
introduction of self-driving cars and advocate for “strict 
liability to autonomous car owners.”14 And though California 
originally stipulated that “the conversion of vehicles originally 
manufactured by a third party shall control issues of liability 
arising from the operation of the autonomous vehicle,” the 
legislature struck this provision on reconsideration. 15  This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750(b)(1) (West 2013). 
11 Id. 
12 Joseph B. White, The Big Worry About Driverless Cars? Losing Privacy, 
WALL ST. J. BLOG (June 3, 2013), http://blogs.wsj.com/drivers-seat/2013/06 
/03/the-big-worry-about-driverless-cars-losing-privacy (demonstrating the 
extent of public worry about how self-driving cars will affect privacy). But 
see Timothy B. Lee, Self-Driving Cars Are a Privacy Nightmare. And It’s 
Totally Worth It, WASH. POST BLOG (May 21, 2013), http://www 
.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/05/21/self-driving-cars-are-
a-privacy-nightmare-and-its-totally-worth-it (suggesting that the very real 
threat self-driving cars pose to user privacy is outweighed by other 
benefits they provide). 
13 See Jeffrey K. Gurney, Sue My Car Not Me: Products Liability and 
Accidents Involving Autonomous Vehicles, 2013 U. ILL. J.L. TECH & POL’Y 
247; Kevin Funkhouser, Note, Paving the Road Ahead: Autonomous 
Vehicles, Products Liability, and the Need for a New Approach, 2013 UTAH 
L. REV. 437. 
14 Sophia H. Duffy & Jamie Patrick Hopkins, Sit, Stay, Drive: The Future of 
Autonomous Car Liability, 16 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 453, 453 (2013). 
15 LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL: STATE OF CAL., LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL’S DIGEST, div. 
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vacillation only hints at the uncertainty surrounding the 
complex liability issues for crashes involving AVs, which, in 
many ways, defy the traditional conceptions of fault and agency 
at play in automobile accidents. 
Nearly all of the literature on self-driving cars explores 
either their impact on social values like freedom and privacy16 
or the questions they pose for legal liability.17 These lines of 
inquiry have developed largely in isolation, with little effort to 
examine how they might intersect and inform each other.18 
This Article advances an integrated approach: regulators 
should consider freedom, privacy, and liability as interlocking 
pieces—not independent elements—of the puzzle of self-driving 
car regulation. Unlike much of the existing literature on self-
driving cars, which suggests a one-size-fits-all framework for 
assessing liability,19 I propose a more effective regime, in which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 See Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy in Autonomous Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA 
L. REV 1171, 1177 (2012); Rachael Roseman, When Autonomous Vehicles 
Take over the Road: Rethinking the Expansion of the Fourth Amendment 
in a Technology-Driven World, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2014); Francesca 
Svarcas, Turning a New Leaf: A Privacy Analysis of Carwings Electric 
Vehicle Data Collection and Transmission, 29 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 165 (2013). 
17 See, e.g., Gurney, supra note 13; Gary E. Merchant & Rachel A. Lindor, 
The Coming Collision Between Autonomous Vehicles and the Liability 
System, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1321 (2012); Robert W. Peterson, New 
Technology—Old Law: Autonomous Vehicles and California’s Insurance 
Framework, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1341 (2012); Funkhouser, supra note 
13; Julie Goodrich, Comment, Driving Miss Daisy: An Autonomous 
Chauffeur System, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 265 (2013).  
18 However, groundbreaking articles by Eugene Volokh and Bryant Walker 
Smith have begun to analyze the tension inherent between consumer 
privacy and certain common law tort standards. Volokh proposes that an 
invasion of consumer privacy should be weighed against increased safety; 
Smith suggests that this dynamic will usher “in a new age of product 
stewardship.” Bryant Walker Smith, Proximity-Driven Liability, 102 GEO. 
L. REV. 1777, 1779 (2014) (“[G]rowing proximity [between buyers and 
sellers] could significantly expand sellers’ point-of-sale and post-sale 
obligations toward people endangered by their products.”); Eugene 
Volokh, Tort Law vs. Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 879, 883 (2014) 
(“[W]hen the technologies become cheap enough, it becomes plausible to 
claim that a manufacturer is negligent for designing a deadly machine 
that fails to inexpensively surveil its operator for signs of dangerous 
driving and to inexpensively report the operator’s dangerous driving to 
the authorities.”).  
19 See Duffy & Hopkins, supra note 14, at 453 (advocating for “strict liability 
to autonomous car owners”); Andrew P. Garza, “Look Ma, No Hands!”: 
Wrinkles and Wrecks in the Age of Autonomous Vehicles, 46 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 581, 581 (2012) (“Products liability law is capable of handling the 
advent of autonomous vehicles just as it handled seat belts, air bags, and 
cruise control.”); Dylan LeValley, Autonomous Vehicle Liability—
Application of Common-Carrier Liability, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. SUPRA 5, 
6 (2013) (arguing that AV manufacturers should be treated like “common 
carriers” who owe “the public the highest duty of care [and are] liable for 
even the slightest negligence”). 
5
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an AV user’s legal responsibility for the behavior of her AV 
varies in response to the degree of user freedom and privacy 
her AV protects. 
In Part I, I examine the freedom and privacy interests at 
stake with AV technology and demonstrate that the degree to 
which self-driving cars protect these values will be determined 
by where the vehicles fall on the discretionary-nondiscretionary 
and communicative-uncommunicative spectrums (defined 
below). In coining these terms, I hope to provide a functional 
language for understanding whether a particular model of self-
driving car will infringe on its user’s freedom and privacy. In 
Part II, I explore how the application of existing common law 
doctrine could shift liability away from the users of AVs toward 
third parties like manufacturers or government entities as AVs 
become less discretionary and/or more communicative. The 
Article also provides the first sustained inquiry into how 
different liability regimes for AVs might in turn generate 
sizable efficiencies in liability and insurance administration. In 
Part III, I make a normative appeal to regulators: only allow 
AVs to infringe on user freedom and privacy if: (1) reductions 
in freedom and/or privacy lead to equivalent reductions in 
liability for the users of self-driving cars, and (2) 
administrative efficiencies or other identifiable social benefits 
outweigh the social costs incurred by forfeiting these values. By 
tying the reduction of user freedom and privacy to 
improvements in both individual and social welfare, this 
Article charts a possible course for regulators to reconcile 
freedom and privacy concerns with tort liability in AV 
regulation. 
I. FREEDOM AND PRIVACY 
Though some assume that self-driving cars will inevitably 
compromise their users’20 freedom and privacy, AVs could take 
a variety of forms, each of which would affect these two values 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 I choose to examine freedom, privacy, and liability from the perspective of 
the “user” instead of alternatives such as “owner” or “driver” for a number 
of reasons. First, personal ownership of self-driving cars may not always 
be the norm. See Jonathan Keane, Google Thinks Self-Driving Cars Will 
Reduce Car Ownership, PASTE (July 7, 2014), http://www.pastemagazine 
.com/articles/2014/07/google-thinks-self-driving-cars-will-reduce-carow 
.html. Second, referring to an individual using a self-driving car as a 
“driver” could well become a misnomer, especially if she does not or cannot 
operate the vehicle herself. See OPEN ROBOETHICS INITIATIVE, Kids with 
Wheels: Should the Unlicensed Be Allowed to “Drive” Autonomous Cars?, 
ROBOHUB (May 26, 2014), http://robohub.org/kids-with-wheels-should-the-
unlicensed-be-allowed-to-drive-autonomous-cars (asking whether unlicen-
sed drivers such as children should be permitted to use self-driving cars in 
the future).  
6
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differently. 21  Intelligent highways, 22  for example, could 
compromise user freedom and privacy by controlling and 
communicating with all cars simultaneously via an external 
authority; self-contained vehicles could protect user privacy by 
storing all maps, hardware, and data necessary to operate on-
board; 23  and Google’s latest prototype could reduce user 
freedom by preventing users from exerting direct control over 
the car.24 
Of course, regulators need not accept private companies’ 
decisions on how much freedom or privacy self-driving cars will 
preserve. Regulators can, and often do, provide guidelines that 
help shape emerging technologies in ways that protect 
cherished values. 25  Take the Privacy by Design (PBD) 
movement, spearheaded by the Information and Privacy 
Commissioner of Ontario. By employing a variety of 
prophylactic measures during a product’s development, PBD 
induces manufacturers to limit their invasions of user privacy 
to the bare minimum at each level of product functionality. 26 
Numerous companies worldwide, from Google to Intel, have 
voluntarily allowed PBD to steer their development of 
potentially privacy-threatening technology.27 In fact, privacy 
scholar Dorothy Glancy has advanced AV technology as an 
ideal candidate for just this treatment.28  
As regulators debate and enact policies for freedom and 
privacy protection, they will influence the ultimate form self-
driving cars assume. In this Part, I propose that attempts to 
protect user freedom will determine how discretionary a vehicle 
must be, while attempts to protect user privacy will limit how 
communicative a vehicle can be. I then examine a few ways in 
which these values may intersect with one another. After 
assessing how and why regulators might embed these two 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Because I am interested in issues of user freedom and privacy, I will 
examine self-driving vehicles as if they will always have human users 
and/or passengers, although this may not always be the case. 
22 Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) Communications for Safety, U.S. DEP’T OF 
TRANSP.: INTELLIGENT TRANSP. SYS. JOINT PROGRAM OFF., http://www.its 
.dot.gov/safety/v2i_comm_safety.htm (last updated Jan. 22, 2015). 
23 Glancy, supra note 16, at 1177. 
24 Brandon Griggs, Google’s New Self-Driving Car Has No Steering Wheel or 
Brake, CNN, May 28, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/28/tech/inno 
vation/google-self-driving-car. 
25 See Batya Friedman, Value-Sensitive Design, INTERACTIONS, Nov.-Dec. 
1996, at 16, 17. 
26 Ann Cavoukian, 7 Foundational Principles, PRIVACY BY DESIGN, http:// 
www.privacybydesign.ca/index.php/about-pbd/7-foundational-principles 
(last visited Nov. 25, 2014).  
27 See Kashmir Hill, Why ‘Privacy by Design’ Is the New Corporate Hotness, 
FORBES, July 28, 2011, http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2011/07 
/28/why-privacy-by-design-is-the-new-corporate-hotness. 
28 Glancy, supra note 16, at 1235. 
7
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values into self-driving cars, I will analyze the liability 
repercussions of various value-sensitive designs. 
A. Freedom: Discretionary Vehicles 
Some drivers might find it “dehumanizing” to lose “choice 
and control” when behind the wheel (if there even is one) of a 
self-driving car.29 As one commentator wrote, “miserable as 
Americans are behind the wheel, they still love cars because 
they love being in complete control of a powerful machine. Take 
away the wheel and the pedals, and you’ve taken away 
whatever joy there is to driving.”30 Technology that strips cars 
of this symbolic and emotional value will, consequently, face 
resistance from diverse groups like automobile enthusiasts, 
rebellious teenagers, and those distrustful of big government.  
Inherent in the very name of autonomous vehicles is the 
idea that they will, to some degree, take autonomy away from a 
human user. Even the most basic AV technology undermines 
user autonomy to some extent: lane-maintenance technology, 
adaptive cruise control (ACC),31 and electronic stability control 
(ESC) 32  all make driving decisions independent of human 
users. More broadly, the very decision to use autonomous 
technology implicates a driver’s freedom, and that decision 
might not always remain in an individual’s hands. 
Though all AV technology bears in one way or another on a 
user’s autonomy, there is a real difference between what I call 
discretionary vehicles, which would grant individuals 
maximum discretion over when, where, why, and how their 
vehicles drive, and nondiscretionary vehicles, which would 
assume almost all operational autonomy from the human 
driver. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy and Intelligent Transportation Technology, 11 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 151, 155 (1995).  
30 Ben Walsh, Self-Driving Cars Are Still Cars—Which Means They Won’t 
Improve Your Commute, NEW REPUBLIC, May 29, 2014, http://www 
.newrepublic.com/article/117943/googles-self-driving-cars-miss-problem-
mobility-america. 
31 Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) allows the user of a vehicle to input a 
desired speed and following distance. ACC then adjusts the speed of the 
vehicle according to the location of other cars on the road, returning to the 
desired speed once safe to do so. Adaptive Cruise Control and Collision 
Warning with Brake Support, FORD (July 2012), http://corporate.ford.com 
/doc/Adaptive_Cruise.pdf. 
32 Electronic Stability Control (ESC) “continuously compares the driver's 
steering wheel position to the direction of travel of the vehicle. When the 
control unit detects a difference, ESC operates by independently applying 
the brakes to individual wheels. In some cases, it will reduce the engine 
power as well.” ESC, NAT’L ROADS & MOTORISTS’ ASS’N,	   http://www.myn 
rma.com.au/motoring-services/buy-sell/buying-advice/features/stability-
control.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2014).  
8
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 17 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol17/iss1/4
2015 The Costs of Self-Driving Cars 
 
179 
Discretionary vehicles would maintain the freedom and 
personal autonomy of their users to the greatest extent 
possible, allowing users to turn the self-driving function on and 
off, adjust its driving profile, or override its choice of route. In a 
situation familiar to any user of Google Maps, the user of a 
discretionary vehicle might be presented with a default route 
between A and B, but have the option to alter the path as she 
saw fit (to avoid tolls or heavily trafficked roads, for instance). 
Further, a user of a discretionary vehicle might have the ability 
to alter her vehicle’s driving profile.33 A user might want to ask 
her self-driving car to drive aggressively when she is late for a 
job interview, but leisurely when driving down a beautiful 
stretch of coastal highway. Because users would retain the 
ability to turn the automated driver on and off at will, AV 
technology in a discretionary vehicle resembles an advanced 
form of driving assistance—that is, the technology is a useful 
feature that removes some of the stress and danger of driving, 
but to which autonomy is ceded on a discretionary basis. 
As of this writing, regulators seem to prefer discretionary 
vehicles, with California and Nevada mandating that self-
driving cars return driving authority to their users whenever 
requested. 34  Given this current regulatory preference, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that most in-development AVs, like those 
being worked on by Toyota, Nissan, Volvo, and Honda, appear 
to be discretionary in their basic contours.35  
Nondiscretionary vehicles, in contrast, would limit their 
users’ autonomy by precluding them from determining their 
own route, choosing their preferred driving style, engaging and 
disengaging the automated-driver at will, and/or driving in 
certain places or at certain times of day. A nondiscretionary 
vehicle might refuse to travel on unsafe and unpaved roads, or 
when weather conditions are too severe.36 It is not difficult to 
imagine fleets of unmanned, nondiscretionary taxis roaming 
the streets of major metropolitan areas and offering limited 
passenger input.37 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Eric Jaffe, Will Self-Driving Cars Have Road Rage?, THE ATLANTIC, May 
30, 2014, http://www.citylab.com/tech/2014/05/will-self-driving-cars-have-
road-rage/371709 (discussing the pros and cons of allowing users to choose 
their vehicles’ driving behavior). 
34 CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750(c)(1)(D) (2013); NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A.190(2)(g) 
(2012). 
35 Sanburn, supra note 2 (listing the companies with self-driving technology 
in development and giving a brief explanation of how they function). 
36 Adam Clark Estes, What’s Keeping Self-Driving Cars Off the Road?, 
GIZMODO, Oct. 24, 2013, http://gizmodo.com/whats-keeping-self-driving-
cars-off-the-road-1450916024 (describing the difficulty self-driving cars 
have in navigating roads with inclement weather). 
37 William White, GOOG: Will the Google Self-Driving Car Kill Taxi 
Business?, INVESTORPLACE, June 23, 2014, http://investorplace.com/2014 
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If nondiscretionary vehicles seem farfetched, keep in mind 
that Google has recently revealed the prototype of a self-driving 
car with no steering wheel, gas pedal, or driver-accessible 
brake.38 A vehicle like this could realize the fears of those who 
worry that self-driving cars will eventually place serious 
restrictions on user freedom. Furthermore, certain proposed 
uses of AV technology might require that all self-driving cars 
be nondiscretionary. Most notably, intelligent highways would 
need universal compliance in order to simultaneously control a 
full road of cars.39  
B. Privacy: Communicative Vehicles 
Though situated within a broader national discussion about 
the privacy implications of disruptive technologies (such as 
smartphones, social media platforms, and surveillance 
satellites), roadway privacy presents singular challenges that 
have been discussed in both courts 40  and the academic 
literature.41 Some privacy-threatening roadway technology is 
already in widespread use. Traffic signals increasingly come 
equipped with video cameras, toll tag transponders make a 
note each time a driver passes by their sensors, and event data 
recorders store the performance of a vehicle in the seconds 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
/06/goog-google-google-self-driving-car (suggesting that self-driving cars 
may become direct competitors to taxi services). 
38 Griggs, supra note 24. 
39 An intelligent highway:  
is an intelligent transportation system, in which vehicles 
and highways will exchange information through a two-way 
communication system. The automated highways will have 
a set of lanes on which vehicles with specialized sensors and 
wireless communications systems could travel under 
computer control at closely spaced intervals . . . . [T]he 
system can coordinate traffic flow more efficiently, reduce 
speed fluctuations, monitor unsafe vehicle operation, and 
traffic shock waves, maximize highway capacity and 
minimize avoidable traffic congestion.  
Alberto Martin, Hector Marini & Sabri Tosunoglu, Intelligent 
Vehicle/Highway System: A Survey, Presentation at the Florida 
Conference on Advances in Robotics (Apr. 29-30, 1999), available at 
http://www.eng.fiu.edu/mme/Robotics/elib/IVHS%20Part%201%20v2.pdf. 
This level of massive coordination could probably only be achieved if the 
intelligent highway system simultaneously controlled every car on the 
highway, or at least those cars with access to the lanes governed by the 
intelligent highway. 
40 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (adjudicating the 
legality of unwarranted GPS tracking of vehicles). 
41 See, e.g., Lisa Belrose, Do Automobile Passengers Have a Legitimate 
Expectation of Privacy?, 28 TOURO L. REV. 771 (2012) (discussing 
reasonable expectations of privacy in vehicles); Stephen A. Josey, Note, 
Along for the Ride: GPS and the Fourth Amendment, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & 
TECH. L. 161 (2011) (discussing the Fourth Amendment implications of 
using a GPS to track vehicles). 
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leading up to a collision.42 But AV technology might bring 
other, potentially more intrusive, invasions of privacy. 
Self-driving cars could compromise their users’ privacy by 
transmitting not only “[t]he present location of an autonomous 
vehicle user [and] that person’s past travel patterns,” but also 
“his or her future travel plans,” which could be employed for 
“targeted marketing,” “law enforcement,” or “surveillance.”43 
Whether or not a vehicle is likely to threaten its passengers’ 
privacy can largely be reduced to the question of whether or not 
that vehicle is communicative. A communicative vehicle 
generally will engage in at least one of the following behaviors: 
relaying vehicle information to third parties; receiving driving 
instructions or other data from external sources; or speaking 
with other self-driving cars in its vicinity. Though on-site 
hacking is always a possibility, a vehicle that does not 
participate in any of these communicative functions will better 
protect user privacy than one that does. This is in part because 
vehicles that do not communicate will be less likely to collect 
extensive information about its users in the first place. 
Communicative vehicles could take a number of different 
forms, though a few especially important possibilities are worth 
noting.  
Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) technology would enable the 
“dynamic wireless exchange of data between nearby vehicles.”44 
This exchange would allow self-driving cars to “sense threats 
and hazards . . . calculate risk . . . or take pre-emptive actions 
to avoid and mitigate crashes.”45 Because V2V technology sends 
“internal vehicle status information to or through an external 
network,” users face an increased risk of having this 
information compromised or improperly used.46 A rash of over 
300,000 wireless router hacks earlier this year highlights the 
vulnerability of such networks.47  
Communicative vehicles might also relay “vehicle status 
data in real time to roadside infrastructure for use by traffic 
management centers, toll collection agencies, or law 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 See Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, How Technology Drives 
Vehicular Privacy, 2 J.L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y. 3 (2006) (discussing the 
technological threats to vehicular privacy already present on the road). 
43 Glancy, supra note 16, at 1196. 
44 See Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) Communications for Safety, NAT’L HIGHWAY 
TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., http://www.nhtsa.gov/Research/Crash+Avoidance 
/Vehicle-to-Vehicle+Communications+for+Safety (last visited Feb. 16, 
2015). 
45 Id. 
46 Glancy, supra note 16, at 1177. 
47 Dan Goodin, Hackers Hijack 300,000-Plus Wireless Routers, Make 
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enforcement.” 48  Judging by the uproar occasioned by the 
comparatively unobtrusive introduction of red light cameras,49 
many AV users would probably be averse to having their 
vehicles’ behavior systematically relayed to local police and/or 
other government entities. Finally, the central computing unit 
of an intelligent highway might need to know information 
about each individual car, like its make, its intended 
destination, and whether it is an emergency vehicle. The 
potential for intelligent highways to facilitate widespread 
surveillance is obvious and, depending on one’s viewpoint, 
frightening.50  
An autonomous vehicle that either refuses to or is incapable 
of transmitting such information is uncommunicative. Many 
vehicles currently in development, including the original 
Google Car, more or less follow this self-contained, 
uncommunicative model. These vehicles store all hardware and 
software necessary to operate on-board, relying on detailed 
maps that they supplement with 360-degree sensors and 
powerful computer processors to find their way around.51 As 
long as uncommunicative vehicles are engaged in practices that 
would prevent on-site information theft, like data deletion and 
encryption, they could theoretically protect personal 
information privacy just as well as non-automated cars can.  
There is one important caveat: it appears that all self-
contained AVs currently in development engage in at least one 
communicative function. Namely, they receive GPS coordinates 
from a transponder to help determine their location.52 As long 
as uncommunicative AVs use passive GPS receivers—which do 
not transmit their own location, and cannot be tracked by third 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Glancy, supra note 16, at 1178. 
49 See, e.g., Stephen Hudak, Red Light Camera Furor: Clermont Tosses 150 
Tickets, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 23, 2012, http://articles.orlandosentinel 
.com/2014-02-23/news/os-clermont-throws-out-red-light-tickets-2014022 
3_1_councilman-ray-goodgame-clermont-police-red-light-camera-program 
(detailing local distaste for automated-ticketing and its temporary 
suspension from use in Orlando, Florida). 
50 See Sheri A. Alpert, Privacy and Intelligent Highways: Finding the Right 
of Way, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 97 (1995) 
(discussing the potential privacy implications of intelligent highways and 
how these concerns might be abated). 
51 Erico Guizzo, How Google’s Self-Driving Car Works, IEEE SPECTRUM (Oct. 
18, 2011), http://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/artificial-intelligen 
ce/how-google-self-driving-car-works (exploring the design and function of 
Google’s self-driving car). 
52 The Economist Explains: How Does a Self-Driving Car Work, THE 
ECONOMIST, Apr. 29, 2013, http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-
explains/2013/04/economist-explains-how-self-driving-car-works-driverless 
(“Ultrasonic detectors . . . [g]yroscopes, accelerometers and altimeters 
provide more accurate positioning than is possible using global-
positioning system (GPS) satellites alone. Google’s cars scan their 
surroundings to build [and] update [a] 3D map.”). 
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parties—the privacy risks at play in using the GPS system 
should be kept to a minimum.53 
Notably, the degree to which communicative vehicles affect 
their users’ privacy will be determined in large part by the 
ongoing national debate over location privacy. Importantly, 
federal courts have yet to indicate decisively when an 
individual’s location data can be accessed by law enforcement 
and how it can be used. In 2012, the Supreme Court 
determined in United States v. Jones that installing a GPS 
tracker onto a vehicle without a warrant violates a suspect’s 
Fourth Amendment rights.54 In June 2014, the 11th Circuit, 
following Jones, ruled that it was unconstitutional for law 
enforcement to use and obtain a suspect’s cellphone location 
data without a warrant.55 However, three months later, the 
Circuit granted a petition for rehearing en banc,56 vacated the 
previous decision, and cast serious doubts on what 
constitutional protections Americans have over their location 
privacy. 
C. The Intersection of Freedom and Privacy 
Though this Article has thus far made a clean distinction 
between freedom and privacy, these two values intersect in a 
number of meaningful ways. The idea that systematically 
depriving an individual of her privacy greatly restricts her 
autonomy famously motivated Jeremy Bentham to propose the 
Panopticon, a prison in which every single room, nook, and 
cranny can be seen from a single elevated guard post. 57 
Bentham believed the inmates of this Panopticon, not knowing 
whether or not anyone was occupying the guard post at any 
given time, would alter their behavior out of fear of being seen. 
A world in which communicative self-driving cars allow 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 See, e.g., Leslie Baehr, How Does GPS Work?, BUS. INSIDER, July 23, 2014, 
http://www.businessinsider.com/how-does-gps-work-2014-7. 
54 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
55 United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, vacated en banc, United States v. 
Davis, 2014 WL 4358411 (11th Cir. 2014). 
56 United States v. Davis, No. 12-12928, 2014 WL 4358411 (11th Cir. Sept. 
4, 2014). 
57 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PANOPTICON WRITINGS 29-95 (Miran Bozovic 
ed., 1995) (“It is obvious that, in all these instances, the more constantly 
the persons to be inspected are under the eyes of the persons who should 
inspect them, the more perfectly will the purpose X of the establishment 
have been attained. Ideal perfection, if that were the object, would require 
that each person should actually be in that predicament, during every 
instant of time. This being impossible, the next thing to be wished for is, 
that, at every instant, seeing reason to believe as much, and not being 
able to satisfy himself to the contrary, he should conceive himself to be 
so.”). 
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constant surveillance by law enforcement authorities could 
similarly constrain user freedom.58  
Conversely, uncommunicative vehicles might restrict their 
users’ freedom if users desire their cars to transmit information 
to third parties. Families driving two cars on a cross-country 
road trip might want the cars to communicate location data 
with one another so as to coordinate driving decisions.59 This 
dynamic can already be seen in cell phone use: iPhone apps like 
Find my Friends allow users to meet up more easily by 
transmitting their location data to one another.60  
Though less obvious, an AV user’s ability to exercise 
autonomy could also affect her privacy. A user’s ability to vary 
her route could make her harder for stalkers, law enforcement 
agencies, or the paparazzi to track. The inability to tell one’s 
AV to drive stealthily might reduce a user’s privacy by 
preventing her from driving undetected—for example, imagine 
a teenager trying to sneak the car home late at night after her 
curfew. On the other hand, an individual’s inability to input 
driving preferences might actually enhance her privacy, 
because she would not have to reveal her familiar routes, 
driving style, or driving skill. 
Despite their considerable overlap, freedom and privacy are 
nonetheless distinct values worth examining independently. 
The two values do not map clearly onto one another: as 
evidenced by the discussion above, the lack (or presence) of one 
value may strengthen or weaken the other, depending on the 
particular AV design. In addition, not all of the concerns raised 
above are likely to come to fruition. Even if an AV broadcasts 
its user’s information to a third party, the transmission is only 
likely to adversely impact the user’s freedom if the third party 
holds financial or legal leverage over her (e.g., vehicles that 
transmit driving behavior to law enforcement would probably 
constrain behavior more than those that transmit aggregate 
driving statistics to a non-profit research institution). 
Moreover, the privacy concerns raised by restricting user 
freedom are mostly either abstract or non-threatening, and 
pale in comparison to the privacy harms that could potentially 
be incurred by data communication. Finally, as Part II 
demonstrates, freedom and privacy provide distinct doctrinal 
routes for determining a user’s liability for accidents caused by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 See Jeffrey H. Reiman, Driving to the Panopticon: A Philosophical 
Exploration of the Risks to Privacy Posed by the Highway Technology of 
the Future, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 27 (1995). 
59 This strategic interaction would be even more prevalent with respect to 
commercial vehicle use, where the stakes of coordination are higher and 
privacy concerns likely far lower. 
60 Find My Friends, APPLE: ITUNES PREVIEW, https://itunes.apple.com/us 
/app/find-my-friends/id466122094 (last visited Nov. 25, 2014). 
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a self-driving car, making this analytical separation useful 
from a legal perspective as well. 
II. LIABILITY SHIFTS 
Some users might prefer freedom to privacy, some privacy 
to freedom, some might treasure both equally, and others 
might not be particularly concerned about either. Accordingly, 
this Part examines four different self-driving car paradigms, 
each expressing a unique vector of freedom and privacy 
preferences: discretionary-uncommunicative, discretionary-
communicative, nondiscretionary-uncommunicative and 
nondiscretionary-communicative. Though the degree to which a 
vehicle is discretionary or communicative clearly falls along a 
spectrum, moving between these neat categories will give us 
better insight into how legal liability might shift in response to 
different preferences for freedom and privacy protection. By 
examining these paradigms in roughly ascending order of 
freedom and privacy invasion, I demonstrate how the forfeiture 
of these values might (1) shift liability away from the user of a 
self-driving car, and (2) facilitate the use of increasingly novel 
and efficient forms of liability and insurance administration. 
The parties most likely to be held liable for an accident 
caused by a self-driving car would be the user, the owner (who 
may or may not be the user), the manufacturer of the car, the 
manufacturer of the AV components (which may or may not be 
different from the car manufacturer), 61  or a government 
entity.62 In the ensuing discussion, however, I will limit my 
analysis to users, manufacturers, and government entities.63 
An emerging body of literature has discussed the difficulty of 
assigning liability between various manufacturers for a 
malfunction that occurred while their respective products were 
interacting. 64  As these parts become increasingly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 California law currently considers the “manufacturer” of an AV, for legal 
purposes, to be the entity that modifies the vehicle by installing 
autonomous technology. CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750 (West 2015). 
62 Merchant & Lindor, supra note 17, at 1328 (“If an autonomous vehicle 
malfunctioned and caused an accident, one or more of several entities 
could be held liable. The list of potential parties includes the vehicle 
manufacturer, the manufacturer of a component used in the autonomous 
system, the software engineer who programmed the code for the 
autonomous operation of the vehicle, and the road designer in the case of 
an intelligent road system that helps control the vehicle.”).  
63 The possible role of government entities—either as regulators or as the 
actors controlling the AVs’ actions—is discussed most comprehensively in 
Part II.D. 
64 See M. Ryan Calo, Open Robotics, 70 MD. L. REV. 571, 597 (2011) (“It is 
extremely difficult to discover whether software, as opposed to hardware, 
is responsible for the glitch that led to an accident. If the software is 
responsible, it would be hard to determine whether the precise cause was 
the operating system or the application and, if the latter, which 
application.”); Merchant & Lindor, supra note 17, at 1328-29 (“The 
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interdependent, teasing out responsibility may become nearly 
impossible. However, because this Article focuses on how 
forfeiting privacy and freedom leads to a transfer of liability 
away from individuals and towards third parties like 
manufacturers or government entities, I will not be overly 
concerned with the fine details of which particular 
manufacturer should be held liable for AV accidents. For 
similar reasons, and because statutory and common law 
doctrines already cover many of the questions concerning 
whether the private owner of a vehicle or the individuals she 
authorizes to use her vehicle are liable for its accidents,65 I will 
not distinguish between owners and users of AVs for liability 
purposes.  
Before discussing liability in greater depth, it is important 
to clarify why I propose to view liability for self-driving cars 
primarily through the principles of the law of agency rather 
than the law of product liability, 66 an approach that has been 
popular in the literature.67 While courts do not currently imbue 
robots with legal personhood, 68  scholarship focusing on 
assigning tort liability for the behavior of robots often appeals 
to the principles of agency law.69 Furthermore, Congress has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
various component parts and their respective roles in causing a 
malfunction may be hard to discern and separate for the purpose of 
assigning responsibility. In most cases, it will be the vehicle manufacturer 
who will, for both practical and doctrinal reasons, be the party held liable 
for a crash involving an autonomous vehicle.”). 
65 Potential liability questions could develop, for example, if the owner of an 
AV set the AV-driver to an unsafe driving profile, which caused an 
accident while the car was nominally under the control of a permissive 
user. These novel questions will not be explored further here, however. 
66 If my appeal to agency law proves unconvincing, keep in mind that, as a 
product infringes more upon the freedom and privacy of its user, those 
manufacturers are more likely to incur liability for accidents under a 
product liability regime due to their increased “proximity” to users. See 
Smith, supra note 18. 
67 See Gurney, supra note 13; Funkhouser, supra note 13. 
68 Because courts have been reluctant to treat robots as entities that can 
express agency, this approach might necessitate legislative action. 
Peterson, supra note 17, at 1359 (noting that a “small step, which may 
require legislation, might involve accepting an analogy to agency law.”); 
Samir Chopra, Computer Programs Are People, Too, THE NATION, May 29, 
2014, http://www.thenation.com/article/180047/computer-programs-are-
people-too (suggesting that legal personhood should be extended to robots 
much like it was extended to corporations, and asking whether AVs 
should “be treated like a pet or a child or something else?”). 
69 See, e.g., Samir Chopra & Laurence White, Artificial Agents and the 
Contracting Problem: A Solution via an Agency Analysis, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. 
TECH. & POL'Y 363, 392 (advocating for the adoption of an “agency law 
approach to artificial agents [because it] would permit the legal system to 
distinguish clearly between the operator of the agent . . . and the user of 
the agent”); Stephen T. Middlebrook & John Muller, Thoughts on Bots: 
The Emerging Law of Electronic Agents, 56 BUS. LAW. 341, 354 (2000) 
(“Given that we would turn to the law of agency in order to understand 
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already passed legislation clarifying that individuals can be 
held to contracts entered into by their “electronic agents,” and 
could perhaps take a similar step in regards to self-driving 
cars.70  
What distinguishes robotic devices like AVs from normal 
cars is that AVs exercise, or appear to exercise, autonomy in 
interacting with their human users. In order to locate the least-
cost avoider of accidents involving AVs, 71  an examination 
should be made into who could most cheaply avoid the decision-
making process that led to an accident: a user, a manufacturer, 
or a government entity. Treating AVs as entities with agency 
provides a better framework for assessing the varying 
gradients of control that users, manufacturers, and 
government entities can exercise than would treating AVs like 
garden-variety products.72  
Another reason not to evaluate AVs exclusively under a 
product liability regime is that product liability suits are often 
prohibitively expensive and may be a bad fit for the frequent 
litigation that car accidents instigate. This is not to say product 
liability should play no role in assigning liability for 
discretionary-uncommunicative vehicles: AV accidents that are 
caused by obvious software malfunction or blatant design 
defect, for instance, may be fairly attributed to manufacturers 
under a standard product liability regime. Still, product 
liability cases of the level of complexity likely to be found in 
those involving self-driving cars typically cost more in legal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the relationship between a person and a human servant, it seems prudent 
to look to the same body of law to inform, although perhaps not to govern 
absolutely, the relationships between people and their software 
servants.”). 
70 15 U.S.C. § 7001(h) (2000) (“A contract or other record relating to a 
transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce may not be 
denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because its formation, 
creation, or delivery involved the action of one or more electronic agents so 
long as the action of any such electronic agent is legally attributable to the 
person to be bound.”). 
71 For a discussion of the concept of least-cost avoiders, see generally GUIDO 
CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970). 
72 Moreover, a rubric for evaluating responsibility for accidents involving 
AVs that does not try to determine the faulty decision-maker (human or 
robot) may consequently be unable to properly align incentives for safer 
driving, one of the preeminent justifications for the existence of agency 
relationships in assigning tort liability at common law. Alan O. Sykes, An 
Efficiency Analysis of Vicarious Liability Under the Law of Agency, 91 
YALE L.J. 168, 172 (1981). For instance, if a manufacturer retains no 
ability post-sale to control the use of its AV technology, holding it 
responsible for the reckless use of an AV would not properly align 
incentives for accident cost reduction. If the user could not control the 
operation of her AV, assigning her liability would not sufficiently 
incentivize safer use of the vehicle.  
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fees than the victim receives in compensation.73 And, as a 
recent case concerning the alleged malfunction of Toyota’s 
electronic throttle control system demonstrated, juries are 
willing to give massive judgments against the manufacturers of 
automated technology.74 Allowing principles of agency law to at 
least partially guide AV liability would help avoid the expense 
and inefficiency of product liability suits. 
A. Discretionary-Uncommunicative Vehicles 
A discretionary-uncommunicative AV would preserve, to 
the greatest degree possible, a user’s freedom and privacy. A 
vehicle along the lines of the self-contained Google car (which 
keeps all necessary software and hardware on-board and does 
not communicate regularly with any third parties) offers a 
suitable example for the reader. In this incarnation, AVs look a 
lot like chauffeurs—so much so, in fact, that this comparison 
has been offered up countless times both by commentators75 
and Google itself, which refers to the software that powers its 
flagship AV as “Google Chauffeur.” 76  A user can tell 
discretionary-uncommunicative vehicles which route to take 
and can take the wheel back if she wants to drive. Further, 
discretionary-uncommunicative vehicles do not report back to 
any superiors (except the user) about their driving behavior. 
Common law tort liability for accidents caused by 
chauffeurs is assigned to the chauffer’s principal under the 
doctrine of respondeat superior.77 Respondeat superior holds a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product 
Liability, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1438 (2010) (“Notably, the transfer of a 
dollar to a victim of a product accident via the liability system requires 
more than a dollar on average in legal expenses. Given the limited 
benefits and the high costs of product liability, we come to the judgment 
that its use is often unwarranted. This is especially likely for products for 
which market forces and regulation are relatively strong, which includes 
many widely sold products.”). 
74 Junko Yoshida, Toyota Case: Single Bit Flip that Killed, EETIMES: NEWS 
& ANALYSIS (Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.eetimes.com/document.asp?doc 
_id=1319903. 
75 See, e.g., Megan Rose Dickey, Get Ready for Self-Driving Cars that 
Chauffeur Us Around, BUS. INSIDER, Jan. 16, 2013, http://www.business 
insider.com/get-ready-for-self-driving-cars-that-chauffeur-us-around-2013-
1; Martin LaMonica, Google Self-Driving Car Chauffeurs Legally Blind 
Man, CNET, Mar. 29, 2012, http://www.cnet.com/news/google-self-driving-
car-chauffeurs-legally-blind-man. 
76 Adam Fisher, Inside Google's Quest to Popularize Self-Driving Cars, 
POPULAR SCI., Sept. 18, 2013, http://www.popsci.com/cars/article/2013-09 
/google-self-driving-car. 
77 See, e.g., Perez v. Von Groningen & Sons, Inc., 41 Cal. 3d 962, 967 (1986) 
(holding that an employer could be held liable for a tractor accident 
caused by one of his employees because under “the doctrine of respondeat 
superior, an employer is vicariously liable for his employee's torts 
committed within the scope of the employment”); King v. Stuart Motor 
Co., 52 F. Supp. 727, 728 (N.D. Ga. 1943) (holding that an owner was 
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principal responsible for the torts that her agent causes while 
acting within the scope of employment. Simple enough, but the 
question then becomes: Is a discretionary-uncommunicative AV 
the agent of the user or the manufacturer?  
Because discretionary-uncommunicative vehicles grant 
their users the maximum degree of control, discretion, and 
autonomy over their operation, a discretionary-
uncommunicative vehicle should generally be considered the 
agent of its user, not its manufacturer. 78  Though some 
commentators have questioned the fairness of assigning 
liability to a self-driving car’s user for an accident that occurred 
while the vehicle was in autonomous-driving mode, noted tort 
scholar Robert Peterson has pushed back against such 
criticism, writing that an “autonomous automobile is very 
much like a driver hired by the owner . . . and if the car violates 
the rules of the road . . . perhaps the owner . . . should be liable 
. . . Name the car ‘Jeeves,’ and the step may be easier to 
accept.”79  
Assigning liability to users for accidents in which their 
discretionary-uncommunicative vehicle was at fault would lead 
AV owners to channel this risk through the private insurance 
market, a development the insurance industry seems ready 
and willing to accommodate. Some insurance companies have 
already stepped into this arena by offering premium discounts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
responsible for the acts of her chauffer “under the principle of respondeat 
superior”); Agency—Master and Servant—Automobiles—Liability of the 
Owner of a Family Car, 36 HARV. L. REV. 102, 103 (1922) (“Where one 
member of the family, or the chauffeur, drives another member of the 
family, respondeat superior clearly applies.”). 
78 Courts look to who has “control” over a chauffeur when deciding who the 
chauffeur’s principal is. See, e.g., Shevlin v. Schneider, 193 A.D. 107, 111 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1920) (holding the employer of a chauffeur responsible for 
an accident that occurred while the chauffeur drove the employer’s 
brother because the “chauffeur, in carrying out his employer's orders to 
take the employer's brother out that night, and in effect to go where told 
by the brother, was engaged in the performance of duty for his employer, 
and no change of employment was intended, and no change thereof 
resulted by operation of law”); Dunmore v. Padden, 105 A. 559, 560 (Pa. 
1918) (exempting the employer of a chauffeur for an accident that 
occurred while the chauffeur was driving another man, because there “can 
be no question that at the time the automobile was being operated along 
this highway it was, temporarily at least, a car under the control and 
dominion of [the other man] and not of the owner”). 
79 Peterson, supra note 17, at 1359. If analogizing discretionary-
uncommunicative vehicles to chauffeurs proves unappealing, treating an 
automated driver as a “permissive user” would similarly make the owner 
liable in many states for accidents caused by her self-driving car. Id. at 
1358-59 (“Present law in California makes the owner of a vehicle 
responsible, up to the minimum required coverage for liability insurance, 
for accidents caused by the fault of any permissive user of the automobile. 
Thus, when the actual driver is at fault, the owner is liable without fault 
for the driver's actions.”). 
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for cars that have semi-autonomous technology like ESC and 
ACC installed. 80  Considering that automobile insurance 
companies have long charged customers different prices based 
on assumptions about the safety of their driving, charging cars 
with AV technology a different rate would constitute a modest, 
rather than a revolutionary, change to the existing insurance 
system. 
Above all, manufacturers of self-driving cars have indicated 
that they desire certainty in liability rules,81 and discretionary-
uncommunicative vehicles would probably cause minimal 
destabilization of the existing insurance and liability regimes. 
There is a fitting symmetry here, since discretionary-
uncommunicative vehicles would similarly cause minimal 
destabilization of the current freedom and privacy 
equilibriums. As we move forward, this will serve as the 
baseline against which the liability and insurance methods 
explored in the following sections should be contrasted. 
B. Discretionary-Communicative Vehicles 
Discretionary-communicative vehicles would be designed to 
protect user freedom, but would sacrifice user privacy to the 
extent necessary to perform communicative functions.82 These 
vehicles might be in regular contact with insurers, 
manufacturers, government agencies, law enforcement, and/or 
other third party sources concerning in-vehicle information like 
who is driving, how they are driving, when they are driving, 
where they are heading, and how far they have already 
travelled. This increased back-and-forth between the vehicle 
and third parties could, in turn, have significant repercussions 
for liability and risk assessment. 
For example, the increased information flows occasioned by 
shifting toward a communicative model of self-driving cars 
should expand the permissible scope of a product liability 
framework. Because discretionary-communicative vehicles 
might grant manufacturers “information about [and] access to” 
their vehicles post-sale, the standards that these 
manufacturers face for traditional tort requirements like 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 See, e.g., Car Insurance Discounts, LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE, http:// 
www.libertymutual.com/auto-insurance/auto-insurance-coverage/auto-in 
surance-discounts (last visited Nov. 25, 2014). 
81 Ryan Nakashima, Carmakers at Nevada Show: Driverless Cars Need 
Legal Framework, INS. J., Jan. 13, 2014, http://www.insurancejournal.com 
/news/west/2014/01/13/316913.htm. Consumers would likely also app-
reciate and benefit from certainty in liability rules. 
82 As discussed in Part I, communicative capabilities might significantly 
hamper a user’s freedom, influencing his or her behavior by exposing it to 
third-party sources. In this sense, discretionary-communicative vehicles 
may never be able to protect freedom as well as discretionary-
uncommunicative vehicles could. 
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foreseeability, duty-to-warn, and negligence should shift as 
well.83 Bryant Walker Smith dubs this phenomenon “proximity-
driven liability” and “posits a spiral of proximity and liability” 
that might deepen the ongoing obligations of a seller toward his 
buyers.84 A manufacturer’s increased visibility into the real-
time behavior of a discretionary-communicative AV might 
obligate the manufacturer to warn the user that she is heading 
directly into inclement weather, a traffic jam, an unpaved road, 
or an area where the manufacturer’s vehicles performed poorly 
in the past. 85  At least in some cases, therefore, the 
manufacturer of a discretionary-communicative vehicle should 
likely be held liable for accidents that the user would have been 
responsible for in a discretionary-uncommunicative vehicle.  
Many roadway accidents involving discretionary-
communicative vehicles probably would not fall under these 
expanded conceptions of foreseeability, duty-to-warn, and 
negligence, however. The near infinite variety of situations 
that result in car accidents make it unlikely that every collision 
would be foreseeable or something that a manufacturer should 
have known to avoid or warn a customer about.86 Moreover, 
although  
virtually every untoward consequence can 
theoretically be foreseen with the wisdom born of 
the event, negligence law draws a line between 
remote possibilities and those that are 
reasonably foreseeable; no person can be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Smith, supra note 18, at 1819. 
84 Id. 
85 Liability due to foreseeability might increase for manufacturers because 
[i]ncreased flow of information . . . will render wholly 
expectable much of what was previously unexpected . . . . An 
aerial drone manufacturer might know from GPS data that 
one of its planes regularly passes over a school. An online 
retailer might suspect from sales data that the customer 
buying paint thinner is in the midst of a complicated 
pregnancy. The supplier of digital maps for automated 
vehicles may be able to discern from those very maps that 
children on one block have constructed a zipline at truck 
level over the street. 
Id. at 1797. 
86 Though human error “contributes to as much as 75% of all roadway 
crashes,” few scholars appear to believe that self-driving cars will 
completely eliminate automobile accidents. See Paul Salmon, Michael 
Regan & Ian Johnston, HUMAN ERROR AND ROAD TRANSPORT: PHASE ONE—
LITERATURE REVIEW, ACCIDENT RES. CENTRE 1 (2005), http://www.monash 
.edu.au/miri/research/reports/muarc256.pdf. For instance, even in a world 
far more technologically advanced than the present, a power outage could 
suddenly reduce street level visibility, an earthquake could split the 
ground, or a nearby car could suddenly malfunction and swerve into an 
AV’s lane. 
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expected to guard against harm from events 
which are so unlikely to occur that the risk would 
commonly be disregarded.87  
AV manufacturers consequently would not be required to 
foresee every imaginable risk and warn users about them; they 
would be subjected to a standard reasonableness test. 
In cases where the manufacturer should not reasonably 
have foreseen a danger, or did not have a duty to warn the user 
about it, the user should be held liable for accidents caused by 
her AV. 88  In other words, the communicative nature of a 
discretionary-communicative AV should not, in general, 
preclude the AV from being considered its user’s agent. This 
arrangement would naturally lend itself to a system similar to 
the one that governed the discretionary-uncommunicative 
vehicles of the previous section, characterized by user liability 
and private insurance. 
Determining liability for accidents involving discretionary-
communicative vehicles would be cheaper and more accurate 
than it would be for discretionary-uncommunicative vehicles. 
By reviewing the 360-degree footage of the vehicle’s 
surroundings, which a discretionary-communicative vehicle 
could record and transmit, courts would no longer have to rely 
on inconsistent human recollections to determine fault. 89 
Moreover, these vehicles could generate a continuous log of 
their internal operations, which would indicate when a 
mechanical malfunction, rather than operator error, caused an 
accident.90 
Perhaps more importantly, a private insurance system 
could use the information relayed by discretionary-
communicative vehicles to decrease reliance on stereotypes and 
generalizations, to incentivize users to employ autonomous 
driving systems, and to reduce moral hazard for the insured.  
Historically, insurance companies have factored categories 
like gender and race into their risk assessment formulas.91 
While this practice is now controversial, and insurance 
companies can no longer charge customers differentially by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 See AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 3D § 10:10 (Russell J. Davis et 
al. eds., 1987-2014). 
88 See Part II.A, supra. With the exception of the proximity-related liability 
that manufacturers assume due to communicative functions, users should 
still be liable for accidents involving their discretionary-communicative 
vehicles.  
89 For an account of the inaccuracies of eyewitness testimony, see Robert 
Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony, 15 JURIMETRICS J. 171 (1975). 
90 As with discretionary-uncommunicative vehicles, clear examples of AV 
technology malfunctioning could make the manufacturer liable. 
91 See, e.g., Gary Williams, “The Wrong Side of the Tracks”: Territorial 
Rating and the Setting of Automobile Liability Insurance Rates in 
California, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 845 (1992). 
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race, they still regularly ask applicants about gender, age, 
marital status, and zip code (which has often been employed as 
a proxy for race). 92  Many scholars have challenged the 
fundamental fairness of assigning insurance rates based on 
these generalizations.93 By allowing insurance companies to 
consider actual driving behavior, which discretionary-
communicative vehicles could continuously transmit, into their 
premiums, the insurance industry may be able to reduce its 
reliance on demographics.94 
While usage-based insurance programs like Progressive 
Snapshot and Allstate Drivewise have already begun installing 
monitoring devices into vehicles,95 self-driving cars will come 
equipped with hardware and software capable of generating far 
more sophisticated records of a vehicle’s operation. Instead of 
the crude measures that programs like Snapshot currently 
capture (like stopping speed, acceleration, and turning radius), 
insurers examining the output of a self-driving car could see 
(with the assistance of 360-degree visuals) whether a safe 
braking distance was observed, whether the laws of the road 
were followed, how smoothly turns were handled, and other 
factors of driving performance. These vehicular telematics 
could also provide a telling comparison between the driving 
behaviors of the human driver and her automated companion.  
Because telematics would allow insurers of discretionary-
communicative vehicles to know whether the autonomous-
driver was activated at any given time, insurance companies 
could charge customers different rates based on how often they 
gave the autonomous-driver control of the vehicle. More 
concretely, a person’s insurance rate for the month might look 
something like Monthly Rate = (Risk-adjusted Miles Driven by 
AV)(Per-Mile Insurance Rate for AV) + (Risk-adjusted Miles 
Driven by Human)(Per-Mile Insurance Rate for Human). 
Separating the pricing schemes for the human and machine 
drivers would allow the user of a discretionary-communicative 
vehicle to know whether she or the automated driver was safer 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Id. at 849-52. 
93 See, e.g., John O. Calmore, Spatial Equality and the Kerner Commission 
Report: A Back-to-the-Future Analysis, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1487 (1993); Willy 
E. Rice, Race, Gender, “Redlining,” and the Discriminatory Access to 
Loans, Credit, and Insurance: An Historical and Empirical Analysis of 
Consumers Who Sued Lenders and Insurers in Federal and State Courts, 
1950-1995, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 583 (1996); Williams, supra note 91. 
94 Though insurers already ask for driving records, fine-tuned measures of 
driving behavior have the potential to give insurers a much better idea of 
the probability that a given driver will get in an accident in the future. 
Insurers clearly believe this to be true; this justification is the raison 
d’etre of monitoring-based insurance programs like Progressive Snapshot 
and Allstate Drivewise. 
95 Snapshot Common Questions, PROGRESSIVE, http://www.progressive.com 
/auto/snapshot-common-questions (last visited Nov. 25, 2014). 
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in the eyes of the insurer. The price difference would then 
affect her decision whether or not to delegate driving authority 
to the AV.  
Finally, discretionary-communicative vehicles could reduce 
the moral hazard that automobile insurance currently 
engenders. Moral hazard arises because an insured individual 
does not always pay higher rates for driving more and does not 
bear the full cost of an accident, thereby incentivizing her to 
drive more often and less safely than she would otherwise.96 
Differential insurance rates could reduce moral hazard, since 
an AV user would have to pay extra for driving herself where 
the AV was safer, and would save if she made the decision to 
drive where the autonomous driver was more dangerous. 
Additionally, since her driving skill would be more heavily 
scrutinized, she would be less inclined to indulge in accident-
causing behavior97 and more inclined to forego unnecessary 
driving. 
C. Nondiscretionary-Uncommunicative Vehicles 
Nondiscretionary-uncommunicative vehicles are the mirror 
images of the discretionary-communicative vehicles discussed 
in the last Section: while they would protect user privacy by 
prohibiting systematic communication between the vehicle and 
third parties, they would afford their users little control over 
the AV’s operation. Think of the self-contained, 
uncommunicative Google car from the first section, and then 
take away the steering wheel, gas pedal, and brake. 
Or, more tellingly, just think of a taxi.98 Like the passenger 
in a taxicab, a user’s control over a nondiscretionary-
uncommunicative vehicle might start and end with giving a 
final destination. Analogizing nondiscretionary-
uncommunicative vehicles to taxis helps conjure a different 
principal-agent relationship than the one explored with the 
discretionary-uncommunicative vehicles of Part II.A. As noted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 See Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q. J. ECON. 541 
(1979) (“Moral hazard refers here to the tendency of insurance protection 
to alter an individual’s motive to prevent loss . . . . If the insurer’s 
observations [of the care the insured takes to prevent loss is] perfectly 
accurate [the moral hazard of insurance is eliminated].”).  
97 See Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How 
Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197 (2012) (exploring 
how increased information flows might help reduce the insured’s moral 
hazard). 
98 Though, admittedly, taxi drivers are usually in regular contact with a 
dispatcher (a communicative function), this does not greatly impact 
passenger privacy. The communication between the cab and dispatcher 
serves internal business needs and is not used to gather any personal 
information about customers. A taxi driver usually knows little personal 
information about his passengers and typically does not ask for 
identifying information. 
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above, at common law, “who[ever had] control of the [hired 
driver] during the time he [drove] the automobile” was 
responsible for the hired driver’s behavior.99 Unlike chauffeurs, 
tort law generally treats taxi drivers as the agents of the 
dispatching company, not of the paying passenger. 100 
Analogizing AV manufacturers to the dispatching company101 
suggests that manufacturers will largely adopt responsibility 
for accidents involving nondiscretionary-uncommunicative 
vehicles. Shifting liability for the behavior of a 
nondiscretionary-uncommunicative vehicle towards its 
manufacturer tracks the intuition that, with the loss of user 
input into the operation of a nondiscretionary-
uncommunicative vehicle, the manufacturer is increasingly 
likely to be the lower cost-avoider of accidents than the user.102  
Before I explore the efficiency implications of this reduction 
in user freedom, a more thorough discussion of how 
nondiscretionary-uncommunicative vehicles might achieve 
uniform driving behavior is in order. Whereas current licensing 
requirements for drivers only test basic driving skills and 
knowledge, AVs could be programmed to abide by the law in a 
way that would be impracticable for flesh and blood people. 
Self-driving cars might be prohibited by their programming 
from exceeding the speed limit, going the wrong way down a 
one-way street, rolling through stop signs, running red lights, 
and any number of other legally prohibited behaviors that 
remain common to human drivers. 103  AVs might also be 
required to conform to optimal performance specifications, 
which could further standardize their behavior and guarantee 
their compliance with accepted best practices. 104  In fact, 
existing semi-autonomous technology (like ACC and ESC) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Chauffeur in General Employment of Owner as Servant for Time Being of 
Owner, or of Borrower of Car, 42 A.L.R 1446 (1926). 
100 See, e.g., Montague v. Goolsby, 237 F.2d 776 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Smith v. 
Deutsch, 200 P.2d 802 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948); Ass’n of Indep. Taxi 
Operators v. Kern, 13 A.2d 374 (Md. 1940); William D. Bremer, Liability 
of Taxicab Company for Cabdriver’s Negligence, in 41 AM. JUR. PROOF OF 
FACTS 2D 239 (1985).  
101 A dispatcher, like an AV manufacturer, provides drivers to consumers. 
The consistency and quality of these drivers makes up their “brand.”  
102 Of course, in the event of tampering or unauthorized altering of an AV, 
the user could still be held liable for accidents that her vehicle caused. 
See, e.g., Ellsroth v. Johnson & Johnson, 700 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) 
(holding a manufacturer not liable for deaths caused by drugs it 
manufactured but that were tampered with).  
103 Some predict that too strict observance of speed limits and other laws 
could cause problems for self-driving cars. See, e.g., Brad Templeton, 
Should Self-Driving Cars Obey Speed Limits?, SLATE, Oct. 15, 2013, http:// 
www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2013/10/robocars_do_they
_need_speed_limits.html. 
104 For an early effort at promulgating guidelines for self-driving cars, see 
NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 1. 
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already acts directly on a vehicle’s internals with a level of 
sensitivity and control far beyond what human drivers can 
achieve. To reinforce the legal analogy used above, keep in 
mind that both taxicab companies and their drivers require 
special licensing in most states to ensure a tolerable level of 
uniformity. 105  There can be little doubt, though, that the 
standardization achievable for human drivers pales in 
comparison to what AV technology could accomplish.  
This potential for uniformity is central to nondiscretionary-
uncommunicative vehicles’ bid for more efficient liability 
administration. Recall that there were two drivers (the human 
and the machine) in both discretionary-uncommunicative and 
discretionary-communicative vehicles, and that the user could 
choose which would be behind the wheel at any given time. 
This gave each self-driving car a unique behavioral profile, 
comprised of the particular mix of human and automated 
driving that an individual user preferred. While allowing 
individuals to choose whether or not to drive keeps the number 
of driver profiles unknowable and diverse, mandating the 
installation and use of AV technology could theoretically reduce 
the number of unique drivers to the number of unique AV 
products.106 
Reducing the number of driver categories would not 
necessarily tell us which car was at fault in any particular 
accident, but it might not even be necessary to maintain the 
fault system for accidents involving nondiscretionary-
uncommunicative vehicles. If each self-driving car from the 
same manufacturer were sufficiently uniform, proportional 
share liability might be feasible.107 Rather than determining 
fault for individual accidents, liability could be split based on 
the per-mile accident costs incurred by each AV product. A 
simple equation for Car A’s share of the liability in an accident 
with Car B could look something like: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 See, e.g., Licensing, NYC TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMM’N, http://www.nyc.gov 
/html/tlc/html/industry/licenses_main.shtml (last visited Nov. 25, 2014). 
106 Peterson, supra note 17, at 1377 (“This simply illustrates again why the 
insured’s driving record is irrelevant as a rating factor.”). There are 
exceptions, of course, like vehicles that would make you drive at some 
times and require you to let them drive at others. 
107 Proportional share liability, introduced by Allen Rostron, shares many 
features with market-share liability, a means of assigning industry-wide 
liability without assessing individual fault. The major difference is that 
proportional share liability assigns liability based on a different variable 
than market-share (in this case, accident costs per mile). See Allen 
Rostron, Beyond Market Share Liability: A Theory of Proportional Share 
Liability for Nonfungible Products, 52 UCLA L. REV. 151 (2004). Market-
share liability is discussed further in Part II.D, infra. 
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Of course, the model would need to take into account 
additional factors (for instance, the “Amount of Miles Driven” 
could be risk-adjusted if certain models of self-driving cars are 
used more often in congested cities or rural country roads than 
others).108 Nevertheless, the advantage of such a model is that 
it would charge, in the aggregate, each AV manufacturer for 
the proportion of accident costs in which its cars were involved 
without having to determine fault in any individual case. The 
administrative efficiencies of such a liability approach could 
prove to be tremendous. 
Though some states already require drivers to report their 
annual mileage to insurers, some AV users might find 
reporting this information too communicative for their tastes. 
Even in the absence of adopting the above liability proposal, 
the uniform nature of each self-driving car model’s risk profile 
would still vastly cheapen and simplify the business of insuring 
nondiscretionary-uncommunicative vehicles. To begin with, 
insurers would no longer need to use imprecise proxies like age, 
sex, and geographical location to estimate a driver’s risk 
profile. They could instead simply charge based on how often a 
particular model of self-driving car actually gets in accidents. 
Furthermore, intra-brand uniformity would lower premiums by 
militating against the costly practice of crafting individualized 
insurance rates. Finally, the shift in liability from user to 
manufacturer would likely lower rates, since manufacturers 
can either self-insure or reduce transaction costs by bargaining 
to insure all of their self-driving cars at once.109 By cutting 
down on actuarial work and negotiation costs, the uniformity of 
nondiscretionary-uncommunicative vehicles might generate 
significant administrative efficiencies in the private insurance 
system. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 These factors already influence insurance rates. See, e.g., Car Insurance 
Discounts, LIBERTY MUTUAL INS., http://www.libertymutual.com/auto-insur 
ance/auto-insurance-coverage/auto-insurance-discounts (last visited Nov. 
25). 
109 Peterson, supra note 17, at 1342 (“It also should be more efficient for the 
manufacturer to purchase one policy covering 10,000 automobiles than for 
drivers to purchase 10,000 policies, each covering only one automobile.”).  
Σ(Accident Costs Involving Type A Cars)  
Σ(Miles Driven by Type A Cars)  
Σ(Accident Costs Involving Type A Cars)  
Σ(Miles Driven by Type A Cars)  
Σ(Accident Costs Involving Type B Cars)  
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D. Nondiscretionary-Communicative Vehicles 
Lastly, we come to nondiscretionary-communicative 
vehicles, which are designed to protect neither their users’ 
freedom nor privacy. AV technology might become mandatory 
for all drivers in a world that permits nondiscretionary-
communicative vehicles, and, in any event, will be engaged on 
a nondiscretionary basis when present. Further, these self-
driving cars might communicate with other vehicles, insurers, 
manufacturers, and/or government agencies. Based on current 
proposals, nondiscretionary-communicative vehicles would 
probably fall into one of two camps: interactive or remote-
controlled. As distinct as these two forms appear, a closer 
examination demonstrates that they may pose similar 
repercussions for the liability and insurance systems. 
In the interactive incarnation, nondiscretionary-
communicative vehicles would have V2V technology installed, 
which would allow them to “speak” to each other and 
coordinate their movements. For instance, one vehicle might 
signal to another that it intends to enter the other’s lane, 
leading the receiving vehicle to automatically slow down in 
order to accommodate the merge. Or, local authorities could 
use V2V messages to require cars to move aside for ambulances 
or pull over when tagged by police officers.110 Rules governing 
what type of information vehicles would need to exchange and 
how they should react upon receiving it would almost certainly 
need to be produced. This form of technological standardization 
has been achieved successfully in arenas such as the cell-phone 
industry, where the International Telecommunication Union 
issues regulations that all networks must follow.111 A similar, 
government-sanctioned entity would be a natural candidate for 
propagating standards for V2V technology as well.  
Another possible nondiscretionary-communicative vehicle 
system is the remote-controlled, or “intelligent highway,” 
approach. As opposed to V2V technology, which relies on 
predetermined standards to guide inter-vehicle interactions, 
intelligent highways would beam driving instructions directly 
to vehicles. While no plans presently exist to implement an 
intelligent highway system on public roads, related traffic 
coordination methods have been in development by the 
USDOT112 for many years.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 See John W. Whitehead, Putting Big Brother in the Driver’s Seat: V2V 




111 About ITU, INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, http://www.itu.int/en/about/Pages 
/default.aspx (last visited Nov. 25, 2014). 
112 Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I), supra note 22. 
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What both the interactive and remote-controlled models of 
nondiscretionary-communicative vehicles have in common is 
that, in many cases, neither the user nor the manufacturer will 
cause its accidents. Because decision-making would either be 
guided by pre-established standards (in the interactive 
scenario) or determined externally by an overseer program (in 
the remote-controlled scenario), either the standards or the 
overseer may often be the cause of accidents. But, in that case, 
who should be held liable?  
Because the government might well be either the 
promulgator of V2V standards and/or the administrator of 
intelligent highways, 113  one possibility in the event of an 
accident would be to sue the relevant government authority. 
Indeed, it might be tempting to analogize intelligent highways 
to subway systems or other forms of municipal transportation. 
I think, however, that it is important to resist this temptation. 
Sovereign immunity, which immunizes the state against civil 
and/or criminal suits, has often been invoked to negate suits for 
accidents that occur on public transit systems or as a result of 
regulatory decision-making. 114  Because car accidents would 
likely continue at a reasonable pace even if nondiscretionary-
communicative vehicles were in widespread use,115 denying so 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 Of course, private entities could also be responsible for either of these 
tasks, and movements toward industry self-regulation and public-private 
partnerships in infrastructure management have been on the rise in 
recent decades. Jedidiah Bracy, Will Industry Self-Regulation Be Privacy’s 
Way Forward, THE PRIVACY ADVISOR (June 24, 2014), https://privacy 
association.org/news/a/will-industry-self-regulation-be-privacys-way-forwa 
rd (asking whether industry self-regulation will more likely generate 
privacy protections than gridlocked government entities); Eduardo Engel, 
Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, Public-Private Partnerships to 
Revamp U.S. Infrastructure, THE HAMILTON PROJECT (Feb. 2011), http:// 
www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2011/2/partnerships 
engel fischer galetovic/02_partnerships_engel_fischer_galetovic_paper.pdf 
(“The use of [Public-Private Partnerships] to provide U.S. infrastructure 
increased fivefold between 1998-2007 and 2008-2010.”). 
114 See, e.g., Whittington v. U.S., 99 Fed. Appx. 56, 56 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding 
that the federal government lawfully invoked sovereign immunity to avoid 
liability for a plane crash that might have been caused by the Federal 
Aviation Association’s decision to approve an “airport layout plan that did 
not meet minimum design requirements and [to publish] erroneous 
information regarding [the] airport's runway length”); Lee v. Southeastern 
Pa. Transp. Auth., 418 F. Supp. 2d 675 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (holding that the 
regional transit authority in Pennsylvania could invoke sovereign 
immunity to shield itself from an injury that occurred when a woman 
boarded one of their buses). 
115 Even if self-driving cars were perfect drivers, car crashes would still be 
likely to occur because driver error is not the sole cause of automobile 
accidents. See ENO CTR. FOR TRANSP., PREPARING A NATION FOR 
AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES (Oct. 2013), https://www.enotrans.org/wp-content 
/uploads/wpsc/downloadables/AV-paper.pdf (“Driver error is believed to be 
the main reason behind over 90 percent of all crashes.”); NAT’L HIGHWAY 
TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., NATIONAL MOTOR VEHICLE 
29
Boeglin: The Costs of Self-Driving Cars: Reconciling Freedom and Privacy w
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015
 THE YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY Vol. 17 
	  
200 
many victims the chance to compensation seems unsatis-
factory.  
Instead, manufacturers of nondiscretionary-communicative 
vehicles should be opened up to market-share liability, which 
could more reasonably accommodate this system-wide diffusion 
of agency and shared responsibility. In Sindell v. Abbott 
Laboratories, the Supreme Court of California introduced 
market-share liability, a method of recovery that allows a 
plaintiff to sue a group of manufacturers even when she does 
not know which specific manufacturer caused her harm.116 In 
that case, each manufacturer of DES, a miscarriage-preventing 
compound that had the unfortunate side effect of causing 
cancer, produced the drug for inclusion in various 
pharmaceuticals.117 The case turned on the fact that DES was 
“interchangeable with other brands of the same product” and 
was the only known cause of that specific variety of cancer.118 If 
cars operating under V2V or intelligent highway guidance were 
sufficiently uniform (and, external control and the commingling 
of authority certainly make vehicles more “interchangeable”), 
AV manufacturers could be held liable according to their 
market share for accidents involving nondiscretionary-
communicative vehicles. Whether thought of as a means of 
filling in the liability gap opened up by industry-wide 
interdependence, or simply as a tax of doing business in an 
inherently dangerous area, market-share liability is a practical 
means of assigning liability in markets with uniform products. 
Market-share liability would probably be the simplest and 
cheapest form of liability and insurance administration yet 
examined. In effect, each manufacturer would contribute to a 
fund from which victims would be compensated without having 
to prove responsibility for any accidents. Furthermore, if 
nondiscretionary-communicative vehicles became mandatory 
(as the introduction of either the interactive or remote-
controlled models might require), there would be no need for 
private insurance, since all liability for AVs would be 
transferred to manufacturers. Eliminating the entire 
automobile insurance industry (which has roughly $200 billion 
dollars in annual revenue)119 would be a monumental boost to 
administrative efficiency. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
CRASH CAUSATION SURVEY (2008), http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs 
/811059.PDF. 
116 Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588 (1980). 
117 Id. at 594. 
118 Id. at 595. 
119 IBISWORLD, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE IN THE US: MARKET RESEARCH 
REPORT 4 (2014), http://www.marketresearch.com/Vendors/SampleViewer 
/unlock.ncp?vendorid=2487. 
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E. Mixed Systems 
Though I have presented each paradigm of self-driving cars 
as a discrete possibility, significant middle ground exists 
between approaches. A user who had the discretionary ability 
to alter the route of her self-driving car, but who could not 
actually resume control of the wheel, might find herself held 
liable for a different array of accidents than a user of either a 
fully discretionary or fully nondiscretionary vehicle. Similarly, 
a manufacturer who was relayed information like total mileage 
and speed, but not location, might not meet the requirements of 
foreseeability or duty-to-warn even when the manufacturer of a 
fully communicative vehicle would.120 
 Mixed systems are also possible: it could be the case that, 
in cities, AVs become subject to the authority of intelligent 
highways, while in rural areas, self-driving technology returns 
to self-contained functionality. It might be that, no matter 
what freedom-privacy pairing is eventually deemed most 
appropriate, self-driving cars will first be introduced as 
discretionary-uncommunicative vehicles in order to ease their 
transition into the market. While acknowledging that the 
messy reality of self-driving car regulation will not conform 
exactly to any of the above freedom-privacy pairings, anyone 
trying to understand the freedom, privacy, and liability 
implications of a given self-driving car could gain insight by 
viewing it through the framework discussed above. 
III. RECONCILIATION 
This Article has posited and elaborated upon a connection 
between the forfeiture of privacy and freedom, on one hand, 
and more efficient liability and insurance administration on 
the other. The question remains: Can regulators balance these 
competing concerns when regulating self-driving cars? 
As a closing appeal, this Article argues that regulators 
should only allow AV technology to infringe on user freedom 
and/or privacy when (1) forfeiting these values will lead to a 
corresponding shift in liability toward the manufacturers of 
self-driving cars, and (2) gains in administrative efficiency or 
some other social good outweigh the social costs incurred by 
forfeiting these values.121  
The first condition—that ceding these values must lead to a 
reduction in user liability—aims to individually compensate AV 
users for invasions of their freedom and/or privacy. The 
analysis provided in Part II demonstrated ways in which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 For a more detailed study of these dynamics, see Smith, supra note 18. 
121 I make no attempt to calculate these costs myself; individual communities 
and legislatures might arrive at very different conclusions, and theirs are 
the answers that truly matter. 
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existing tort concepts can be employed to help enact this shift 
in liability if regulators indeed choose to encourage 
nondiscretionary and/or communicative models of self-driving 
cars. Common-law doctrine tends to fulfill this condition; 
regulators should be wary of liability rules that fight against 
this tendency. 
The second condition—that a greater social gain must offset 
the social costs of sacrificing freedom and privacy—aims to 
guarantee that value-sensitive regulation of self-driving cars 
benefits society as a whole. By focusing on how communicative 
and/or nondiscretionary vehicles might lead to sizable 
efficiencies in the administration of liability and insurance, this 
Article has suggested ways in which ceding freedom and 
privacy might be able to satisfy this condition. Though social 
goods ranging from reducing roadway congestion 122  to 
advancing environmental protection123 should also weigh in on 
this calculus, examining them in-depth is beyond the scope of 
this Article. 
Moreover, this Article urges proactive consideration of 
freedom and privacy regulation, which would likely be more 
effective than the free market at finding an optimal balance of 
these values in self-driving cars. Individual consumers are not 
always able to protect their own privacy interests and may not 
even understand when they are threatened by emerging 
technology. Consequently, consumers could end up driving 
vehicles that they never would have purchased had they known 
the extent to which the vehicles would compromise their 
privacy. Likewise, situations could arise in which the free 
market would fail to sufficiently restrict consumer freedom. For 
example, a single user who chose not to participate in an 
intelligent highway system could thwart the system’s entire 
implementation. 
Self-driving cars have the potential to radically alter our 
nation’s roadways. This Article provides a framework for 
conceptualizing the interactions between freedom, privacy, and 
liability that AV regulation will encounter and must reconcile. 
While this Article has raised the possibility that self-driving 
cars will induce the upheaval of the current liability and 
insurance systems, it is important to remember that a robust 
regulatory regime has sprung up around automobile accidents 
in the last century and that attempts to deviate from this 
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precedent will face considerable resistance. Regardless, AV 
technology will be disruptive enough that real changes will 
probably come whether we like them or not—and regulators 
should begin thinking critically about how to address them 
now. When self-driving cars arrive, my hope is that this 
Article’s integrative framework will help us welcome them, 
regulate them, and maximize the benefits they have to offer.  
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